



















Abstract; In this paper, I investigate the way in which legal frameworks concerning immigration 
and border controls have been transnationalised in the European Union (EU) and how migrant 
solidarity activists in EU member states have responded to this development. Taking the 
Eurozone crisis as a starting point, I first develop a critical analysis of the EU project as the 
regional expression of a set of economic and political developments generally referred to as 
‘neoliberal globalisation’. In this context, I propose to look at the dominant contemporary notion 
of European belonging as a legitimising discourse aimed at stabilising the particular social and 
political organisation of the region that the EU has established. I argue that bordering, borders 
and exclusion have been essential to the form of European identity that the EU has put forward. 
The Europeanisation of immigration law and border controls is presented as the material 
embodiment of this dominant notion of European identity. I then present my fieldwork, which 
consisted in interviews and participant observation with migrant solidarity groups and networks 
in three EU member states. One of the main focuses of the fieldwork was to investigate the ways 
in which migration-related activists and organisations have adapted their work in order to 
respond to the developments at the EU level. I present an analysis of my fieldwork data drawing 
on insights from social movement theory. In conclusion, I identify a process of pan-
Europeanisation of migrant solidarity struggles and critically assess its resemblance to an 











Since 2009 and the advent of the ‘Eurozone crisis’, the subject of ‘Europe’ and disputes over the 
required course of action to save the region have been regular features of the media and public 
debate. Yet, beyond the on-going controversy concerning the best ways to implement austerity 
measures and occasional high-level dramas in Brussels, the crucial questions of what the 
European Union (EU) represents, which power dynamics it enacts and what its relationship with 
the peoples of its member states is remain as vague and unclear as ever. Last April, the Spring 
2013 Eurobarometer showed the lowest ever levels of popular confidence toward the EU in the 
six biggest European member states.1 A polling system aimed at measuring popular feelings 
toward the EU, the Eurobarometer, was created in 1973 as Eurocrats and pro-Europe politicians 
were showing increasing concern regarding the growing popular discontent with the European 
project. Notions such as that of ‘European democratic deficit’ were gaining currency to describe 
the tenuous relationship between the then-European Community (EC) and the people of its 
member countries (Chalmer et al. 2006: 64). In a desperate quest for legitimacy, a series of 
measures were designed in Brussels in order to instigate a sense of European belonging or 
‘Europeanism’ among the people of the region. In the absence of meaningful emblems of 
identification with the institutions of the European Community, a major identity-building 
enterprise, largely based on the reproduction of a series of national identity symbols at the 
supranational level, was put in place. Thus, a European anthem was adopted in 1972, followed by 
a European flag in 1983.2  
In this paper, I will first look at how the process of creation of a particular sense of 
European identity and belonging has been put at the service of the European Union project. I 
will argue that the produced notion of Europeanism has mainly relied on identifying and 
excluding the non-European and on drawing borders between Europe and outside. The 
harmonisation of migration and asylum law across the EU will be analysed as the legal 
embodiment of this development. In the second part, I will look at how these forms of 
restriction and exclusion have been challenged. I will present and discuss the fieldwork research I 
carried out with groups and organisations working with migrants in the EU and investigate 
whether and how, in the process of opposing the EU exclusionary framework on migration and 
asylum, new transnational links have developed between these actors, leading to alternative forms 
of European solidarity.  
 
 
The Politics of ‘Europeanism’ 
 
It is perhaps not a coincidence that the growing dissatisfaction and disengagement towards the 
European project occurred as the EC was endorsing a distinctively neoliberal turn, in line with 
the economic orthodoxy of the time. The project of an integrated capitalist market in Europe in 
fact predated the European Community, but concrete steps in this direction had been hampered 
by the persistence of national capitalist interests. It is in the 1970s and 80s that the prerogatives 
of the new neoliberal form of global capitalism pushed national capitals into transnational 
alliances, leading to the 1986 Single European Act which placed firmly on the regional agenda the 
idea of a liberalised European market. This integrated market was to bring back economic growth 
to a Europe slowed down by ‘incrusted and rigid structures of European labour and social 
regulations’ (van Apeldoorn 2001). In practice, history has now shown that this meant the 
 
1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/24/trust-eu-falls-record-low  
2 http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/index_en.htm  
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opening up of European economies to ‘competitors’, twinned with the dismantlement of national 
systems of social protection and welfare. Today, as the failures of the global capitalist agenda 
have become more striking than ever, the neoliberal nature of the European Union remains one 
of the main focuses of popular protests in Europe. From Greece to Portugal, from the UK to 
Spain, the last three years have seen waves of demonstrations and popular anger denouncing the 
capitalist EU and the dictatorship of the ‘Troika’ (the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund).3  
In this context of on-going volatility, the afore-mentioned attempts to conjure a sense of 
European belonging must be seen as part of a vital struggle for meaning on the part of the EU, 
which I call the ‘politics of Europeanism’. As Fran Cetti (2010) puts it ‘the survival of locally or 
regionally based capitals in an internationally hybrid world of instability, regional conflicts and 
economic convulsions demands … an inherently ideological operation to postulate a unitary set 
of interests in the attempt to displace social antagonisms and secure legitimacy’. One of its 
crudest mechanisms has been the production a set of identity symbols at the European level 
reminiscent of the traditional appendages of national identities. Less immediately obvious, the 
attempt to inculcate a sense of Europeanism in the inhabitants of the region has also relied on 
the multiplication of narratives tracing back the roots of the Union to ancient times, drawing on 
European past to present the EU as the linear continuation of a European historical and cultural 
spirit in motion. The idea of a continuous Europe as an entity and as an identity is not a new one. 
Since the 1970s, it has been increasingly asserted as a possible antidote to the unconvincing reality 
of the European Community/Union. A crude example is Jordan’s assertion that ‘Europe is a 
culture which occupies a cultural area’ (Jordan 1973 in Paasi 2001). But one can also note, 
particularly since 1989, a sharp increase in a ‘culture-historical literature on the question of 
Europe’ (Nowotny 2000). Nowotny examines the work of a range of European historians and 
intellectuals, specialised in an array of research areas, and highlights their tendency to concentrate 
on topics concerned with tracing a historical sense of European identity.  He claims that: 
 
From the medievalist Jacques Le Goff to Rémi Brague, professor of Arabic philosophy, 
the "postmodern" conservative Peter Koslowski and the left-wing liberal Massimo 
Cacciari, this literature shares a specific interest in a historiologically decipherable 
"identity", as well as in culture-historical prototypes of Europe which are supposed to 
allow conclusions – or rather preconceived judgements – on the future shape of the EU 
(ibid, own translation) 
 
A common trait of these researches is that a set of historical events and ideas are drawn upon to 
create a coherent narrative of the construction of Europe as one entity. They also sanctify 
Europe, upholding it as a desirable model with universal validity. In his account of Europe since 
1945, Tony Judt (2005) praises ‘Europe’s emergence in the dawn of the 21st century as a paragon 
of the international virtues: a community of values … held up by Europeans and non-Europeans 
alike as an exemplar for all to emulate’. In the UK, no group expressed better the mythology of 
Europeanism than New Labour. In Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century, Mark Leonard (2005) 
invites his readers to share his dream: ‘Imagine a world of peace, prosperity and democracy… 




3 See this useful press review in French of articles against the Troika: http://actu-leplus.nouvelobs.com/troika-
commission-europeenne-banque-centrale-europeenne-fmi.html 
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The Imagined Community of the EU: ‘Fortress Europe’  
 
In contrast with such essentialist narratives, a number of scholars have elaborated critical 
reflections on these attempts to form a European identity. Gerard Delanty (1995) claims that 
defining Europe has always relied on representations of what it is not and been characterised by 
the lack of European unity besides that achieved through adversity. He demonstrates that lines of 
exclusion/inclusion have always been at the heart of projects related to the idea of Europe and 
that Europe’s cultural and political identity has historically been articulated through a process of 
constant re-construction of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ reflecting particular sets of power relations at given 
points in time. Ideas of Europe have been characterised by their production of an excluded 
otherness, in both geographical and ‘mythological’ terms, which evolves in content throughout 
time (different ‘Others’ are mobilised towards the elaboration of different projects) but remains 
constant as a mechanism. His conclusion is that these dynamics of exclusion are more than ever 
at work in the EU project: ‘who is a European is largely a matter of exclusion, and in the 
dichotomy of self and other which constitutes the discourse of European identity, Europeanness 
is constructed in opposition with the non-European, in particular Islam. This sense of the 
uniqueness of the European is today emerging as a basis for a kind of supranational identity and 
citizenship which European integration does not have’ (Delanty 1995: 9).  
In a similar vein, Marfleet (1999, 2002) examines the role played by Huntington’s theory 
of a ‘clash of civilisations’ in the EU’s attempt to construct a European identity. The clash theory 
relies on primordialist readings of history and of the world, which is seen as divided in hermetic 
areas of ‘culture’. Those belonging to other ‘civilisations’ are erected as absolute Others and it is 
in the mirror of this produced image of otherness that Eurocrats have tried to anchor an ever-
fleeting sense of a European identity. These observations are confirmed by the work of Liz 
Fekete. Looking at recent socio-political developments, Fekete (2001, 2009) examines the rise of 
‘xeno-racism’ in Europe, ‘a racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins, from the 
former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the 
uprooted, who are beating at Western Europe's doors, the Europe that helped to displace them 
in the first place' (Sivanandan in Fekete 2001, 2009). Fekete provides evidence of the intrinsic 
relation that links, on the one hand, the media, legal, discursive and physical practices of xeno-
racism in Europe and. on the other hand, the strengthening of a shared sense of European 
belonging and identity as a basis for European citizenship. In doing so, she demonstrates the 
importance and instrumentality of the (produced) figure of the non-European, the migrant, as a 
crucial ideological cog in the European discourse on identity and belonging.  
Together with these authors, I argue that in spite of its claims to represent a supra- or 
post-national political entity freed from the exclusionary tendencies of the national form, the 
process of production of a European identity has relied on similarly restrictive mechanisms. In 
order to trigger a sense of allegiance within the population of its member states, the EU has 
resorted to the figure of the foreign Other, traditionally mobilised in national identity building 
enterprises, as an ideological counterpoint against which what qualifies as European can be 
defined. This Other has been revamped to fulfil the need of the large regional project and has 
been granted alleged civilisational and cultural features. The idea of the ‘migrant’, sanctified in 
European legislation as the ‘third country national’, has been of utmost importance in the 
construction of European self and otherness.4 The migrant as a constructed figure, who comes 
from outside yet infiltrates the inside, also allows the articulation of two processes of identity 
 
4 It is also important to remember that the EU project does not only erect external borders of absolute otherness but 
also creates internal borders. The use of the derogatory acronym PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) to refer to  
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formation, that of the production of difference and that of the dialectics of the same. The 
importance of such figures in the construction of national identities has already been the subject 
of extensive scholarly attention. Balibar (1996), for example, has offered detailed historical and 
sociological analyses of the role of the border as the place where both difference and sameness 
are produced and has shown that the ‘border is central’ to identity formation in nation-states. 
What is striking in the case of the EU, is the reproduction of similar mechanisms at the 
supranational level. 
The centrality of the border to the EU identity building process is also visible in another 
way. One of the key material embodiments of the European unity and identity that Eurocrats 
have been trying to produce is the suppression of national border controls between member-
states, making it possible for EU citizens to travel across the EU without a passport and visa. 
This free travel zone, named the Schengen Area after the Treaty that created it, currently 
comprises the territories of 25 European countries, including three non-EU member-states 
(Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). Only two of the EU member-states, Ireland and the UK, 
have decided to opt out of Schengen (though the Treaty has been integrated into EU law) and 
three EU member-states (Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania) have not yet implemented it, mostly 
due to restrictions towards the freedom of movement of their citizens imposed by other EU 
countries. The abolition of intra-EU national borders through Schengen has been heralded as the 
ultimate illustration of the progressive potential of the Union. However, a closer examination of 
the EU today reveals a very different picture that contradicts the idea that European nations and 
nationalisms are being replaced with progressive cosmopolitan forces. Schengen operates as a 
single state for international travel and has therefore matched the elimination of internal borders 
with a reinforcement of Europe’s external borders (those with non-EU member-states) so 
ruthless that the term ‘Fortress Europe’ has been coined to describe this process. Only those 
holding EU citizenship – which is derivative in that it can only be acquired through citizenship of 
one of the member states – can benefit from the privileges of Schengen and of freedom of 
movement within the Area. For others, not citizens of a EU member-state, the exclusion from 
national communities is now exacerbated by an exclusion from the community of Europeans. 
The institutions and rules of the Schengen framework thus materially call into existence and 
embody the idea according to which Europeans share a common identity, setting them aside 
from non-European. In this regard, I argue that rather than making nationalism obsolete, EU 
integration is actually crafting a form of hyper-nationalism with similar exclusionary tendencies. 
European identity is thus created at its external and internal borders – in its regime of visa and 
residence permits, in its retention centres, in its discriminatory policies against migrants within 
member states. Haynes puts it very clearly: 
 
it is here, in both the ideas and practice of immigration control, perpetuated both at the 
intergovernmental level and at the level of the EU, that the new ‘Europe’ is being forged, 







Contesting the EU Border Regime 
 
In this context, it is now possible to see why groups and movements contesting EU border 
controls and immigration policies engage with issues at the heart of the European project, 
unsettling one the key mechanisms used to justify and stabilise its existence. Between November 
2011 and November 2012, as part of my fieldwork, I conducted interviews with activists engaged 
in migrant solidarity work in three EU countries, namely France, Italy and the UK, and tried to 
grasp the ways in which their activities challenged and destabilised the dominant European 
discourse. Groups working in solidarity with migrants in Europe are varied and plentiful: they 
range from Brussels-based organisations engaged in policy work and lobbying of EU institutions 
to research groups concerned with documenting and reporting on imprisonment practices in 
detention centres, to numerous community or activists groups providing day-to-day practical 
support to migrants. Before starting my fieldwork per se, I therefore took a while filtering these 
groups in order to select the type of practices and discourses I would be focusing on. My main 
criterion was that activist practices that would constitute my case studies had to conduct migrant 
solidarity work at the European level, rather than solely in local or national contexts. Through 
this pre-research process, I identified 11 groups and campaigns in the three above-mentioned 
countries. I then conducted 21 in-depth interviews, lasting an average of two hours, with 
representatives (members, staff or volunteers) from these groups and networks. In spite of the 
common objective of their activities, my participants display a high level of heterogeneity, with 
groups ranging from established charities with paid staff to loose activist networks with little 
formal structures. Three groups are France-based associations5 (Gisti, Fasti and Migreurop) whilst 
one, the Migrants’ Rights Network (MRN), is a UK-registered charity. No Borders, No One Is 
Illegal (NOII) and Stop Deportation are unregistered activist networks. Finally, PICUM is a 
Brussels-based NGO and European Alternatives calls itself a ‘transnational membership 
organisation’ that brings together local groups. These groups and networks greatly vary in terms 
of yearly income or budget, membership requirements and structures of participation. One of the 
main focuses of my research is the way in which these diverse organisations and networks 
develop transnational links in order to engage in European migrant solidarity work. I am also 
interested in investigating whether any form of grassroots alternative European identity linking 
activists across national borders has been emerging. I will however not be addressing this point in 
this paper. 
In order to meaningfully investigate and study activist practices and examine whether and 
how a process of transnationalisation is taking place, I have used some selected tools and 
concepts developed by Social Movement Theory (SMT) scholars, particularly New Social 
Movement (NSM) theory. The main appeal of SMT was its flexibility, which allowed me to look 
at a wide range of discourses and praxes, varying in shape, method and location, whilst retaining a 
comparative dimension by conceptualising them as forming a continuum – linked by the 
commonality of their aims – rather than as isolated sites of action – characterised by the 
specificity of their approach. NSM theory, a branch of SMT, focuses on the new organisational 
forms developed by contemporary movements, often characterised by decentralised, 
polycephalous and reticulated structures (Freeman 1983: 204). NSM theory focuses on the way 
politicised actors organise in loose coalitions to promote the particular discourse and objectives 
 
5 Under French law, an association ‘is the agreement through which two or more people decide putting in common, 
in a permanent fashion, their knowledge and/or activities for an objective which is not profit-oriented’ (own 
translation from French law on association from 1901). 
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of a social movement but do so in less formalised ways than traditional organisations (Buechler 
1990: 61). This has been of high relevance to the study of a variety of movements that emerged 
since the 1970s (Wiktorowicz 2004a: 12) such as women’s movements (Buechler 1990; 
Staggenborg 1998), lesbian feminists (Taylor and Whittier 1992) and neighbourhood movements 
(Stoecker 1995). NSM theory is particularly adapted to the study of the nascent yet uneven 
network of varied initiatives that I have come across in the field of European migrant solidarity 
activism. The main conceptual tools developed within SMT and NSM theory that I refer to are 
the following: 
 
Opportunities and Constraints: the notions of ‘opportunities’ and ‘constraints’ in relation to 
social movements emerge from the recognition that social movements do not operate in a 
vacuum but rather exist in social contexts characterised by complex configurations of possibilities 
and limitations, which play a part in structuring a movement’s dynamics (Wiktorowicz 2004a: 13). 
Exogenous factors can be both a source of further empowerment or a source of constraint for 
activists participating in social movement politics (Tarrow 1998; Kolb 2007: 52). These 
exogenous factors influence a movement and its choice of tactics and actions, as well as the 
degree of public exposure and visibility it achieves. Generally speaking, these concepts are used to 
describe the level of (formal and informal) access to political institutions and decision-making 
structures; the degree of popularity of the movement’s claims and objectives within the wider 
public; the type of political system the movement operates within and the level of political 
repression it can be exposed to. Often referred to as  ‘political opportunities and constraints’, it is 
worth noting that they also consist of cultural, social and economic factors (Kurzman 1996; Mc 
Adam & al. 2001). Thinking in terms of opportunities and constraints is extremely relevant to 
understand the different ways in which the groups and networks participating in my fieldwork 
organise their campaigns and protests. Factors such as whether groups are acting on their 
national stage or engaging with the European level will determine their chosen methods of 
action. Moreover, a restrictive context in terms of opportunities will often lead groups and 
campaigns to seek new alliances in order to gain more leverage. The question of the 
transnationalisation of pro-migrant initiatives in the EU must thus partly be analysed in relation 
to this mechanism. 
 
Frames: the concept of framing emerges from the observation that ideology is not the sole 
guiding reference for discourse and action. Rather than referring to ideology as the only 
explanatory factor of the way in which people understand their political identities and discourses, 
it is more insightful to understand the role of ideas as socially created, organised and 
disseminated variables (Wiktorowicz 2004a: 15; Oliver and Johnston 2001). The process of 
discourse-creation and construction results in what SMT sometimes calls ‘packages’, which refers 
to the way in which movements frame their arguments by articulating various references and 
ideological resources in response to a problem (Wiktorowicz: 9). One must also remember than 
social movements exist and develop in social, political and cultural fields where multiple actors 
with various agendas and perspectives are competing over ‘framing hegemony’, which means 
they engage in contests to influence the way in which a particular issue or set of issues is 
interpreted and understood (Benford 1993). This is clearly the case of the relationship between a 
movement and the dominant frame it opposes, but contests over framing also happen within 
movements between activists holding different positions (e.g. violence vs. non-violence, 
pragmatism vs. ideologism, engagement vs. non engagement with the authorities, and so on). A 
social movement can be seen as an attempt at disputing the ‘official frame(s)’ in a context where 
mainstream discourses will attempt to limit the institutional resources and the public spaces 
available for the spreading of alternative frames (Noakes 2000; Wiktorowicz 2004a). Selbin (2010) 
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insists on the ‘power of story’, that is to say, the importance of developing a frame of analysis of 
both domination and reaction that successfully compels people to act on their indignation. The 
narratives that activists develop are characterised by ‘associations and connections across time 
and space that people deploy to construct a revolutionary imaginary comprising symbols, names, 
dates, places, grievances, stories, and means and methods, which they then draw on as they 
consider the world and their options’ (ibid: 166). In this sense, frames are crucial interpretative 
devices that operate as translators of grievances and perceived opportunities into the mobilisation 
of activists and resources toward achieving a movement’s goals. The issue of framing is central to 
the work of pro-migrant groups and campaigns I am working with. Not only do these 
organisations have the stated aim to challenge dominant frameworks on migration, I argue that 
they also engage in a work of ‘reframing Europe’ which relies among other mechanisms on 
presenting a different ‘story’ of what Europe represents in the world and in history. 
 
Repertoires: the concept of the ‘repertoire’ (often discussed as ‘repertoire of contentious’ or 
‘cultural repertoire’) of a social movement refers to the set of protest-related tools and tactics 
available to it in a particular context. Commonly used tactics, actions and tools that feature 
frequently in social movements’ repertoires include public meetings, demonstrations and rallies, 
vigils and sit-ins, petitions and lobbying of governmental institutions, press releases and media 
statements, strikes and pickets, boycotts, among others. Repertoires evolve over time, in response 
to the opportunities and constraints and to the framing strategies chosen by a particular social 
movement (Tarrow 1998). New tactics are integrated into repertoires all the time, as illustrated by 
the recent scholarship around Internet-based tactics and ‘hacktivism’ (Samuel 2004; Knapp 2005). 
My fieldwork will look in particular at how groups develop and selectively use several repertoires, 
each adapted to a particular level or type of action, and how, in the process of collaborating with 
other groups, these repertoires often evolve and sometimes converge. 
 
 
The Changing Context of Migrant Solidarity Practices 
 
Solidarity campaigns and groups opposing and denouncing the way in which migrants are treated 
are by no means new. They have featured in Western European countries’ political and social life 
in various forms since the emergence of immigration controls and the importation of migrant 
workers for industrial purposes as early as the late 18th and early 19th centuries.6 However, I would 
argue that while solidarity movements opposing racism, immigration controls and discrimination 
against migrants have been important aspects of the European political scene for decades, the 
groups and movements I am looking at in my research present some qualitative differences with 
previous forms of migrant solidarity. The groups created recently specifically to address issues 
engendered by the Europeanisation of migration frameworks and those that existed before but 
have both been pushed into engaging with European issues have been shaped by the new 
 
6 In his book, No One Is Illegal: Immigration Control and Asylum, Steve Cohen, one of NOII’s founding members, 
provides a historical overview of such movements and groups in the UK. In a similar vein, in Open Borders: The Case 
Against Immigration Controls, Teresa Hayter traces the origins of pro-migrant campaigning in the UK and explores the 
emergence of an explicitly anti-fascist and anti-racist dimension to migration struggles in the 1970s (Hayter 2004). 
Similar developments can be identified in other European countries, including France, though they vary in form and 
content. The Italian context, like that of other southern European countries such as Spain and Portugal, is 
significantly different in that, until the 1970s, Italy was mostly a source of emigration rather than a destination of 
immigration. As Italy increasingly became a destination of immigration, the Italian anti-racist movement emerged 
throughout the 1980s and held its first significant protest rally in 1989. 
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political and social context of migration in Europe. Here, I would like to mention three recent 
developments that have affected the political identities of pro-migrant groups and activists.  
First, there has been an irruption of migrant-led struggles, which have brought a new 
migrant subjectivity into the political discourse associated with migration. The intervention of 
migrant-led initiatives in the political space of European societies is a relatively new phenomenon 
that has nonetheless deeply affected the ways in which pro-migrant groups operate and 
conceptualise their work. Though the relationship of the organisations and groups I have 
interviewed with migrant-led groups varies, the conceptual recognition of a subjectivity and 
agency of migrants, as a diverse and heterogeneous group, is unanimously asserted.  
 
Since the 1990s, we have much more organic links with organised groups of migrants. 
This is not because we didn't work directly with migrants before, but… there were few 
self-organised groups… This has changed, we have partners and that means our work has 
to be always grounded on the daily reality of the lives of sans papiers. This was a very 
positive development.7 
 
The way in which migrants are objectified by mainstream representations speaking of ‘flows’, 
statistics and numbers whose presence results from ‘push and pull’ factors, is also denounced and 
challenged (Walter 2003). A participant from Italy spoke of eight ways in which the mainstream 
media’s language around migration was flawed: 
 
There are eight rules media follow to speak of immigration. I will tell you about them 
now (…) First, the use of shocking news: statements not corroborated by evidences. The 
phenomenon of irregular migrations is represented as a phenomenon of frightening 
proportions (…) Second, the use of a terminology that involves contempt, that 
dehumanises, that deprives of dignity (…) Third, the use of words with negative 
connotations (…) Fourth, the abusive use of a military terminology like, for instance, 
emergency, alarm, siege, invasion, landing. The message reaching the public opinion is 
that Italy is at ‘war’ and that migrants are ‘the enemy’. Fifth, Italian media interpret the 
migratory phenomenon through the opinion of politicians. But migrations are a complex 
phenomenon requiring experts able to ‘explain’ it. Sixth, a biased selection of people 
participating in the debates (…) Then, the use of words denoting something abnormal or 
extraordinary. For instance: biblical exodus, humanitarian tsunami, earthquake, human 
weapons. Finally, there is a total lack of care and knowledge about the situation in the 
countries of origin of migrants. This calls into question specific political and historical 
responsibilities of Italy towards countries such as Libya, Somalia, Eritrea (…) which have 
a colonial past with Italy.8 
 
This evolution has much to do with the irruption of migrant-led struggles on the national and 
European scenes, where non-citizens affirm their subjecthood and claim their ‘right to have 
rights’, even when and where the space for them to do so has to be claimed by force. The French 
sans-papier movement of the 1990s is a well-known example of this. A large part of the 
scholarship on the sans-papiers focused on the emergence of a new political subjectivity of non-
 
7 Interview with Gisti’s Claire Rodier (Paris, September 2012) 
8 Interview with When We Don’t Exist’s Roberto Noury (Lampedusa, July 2012). 
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citizens and the disruption of the traditional understanding of democracy, civil rights, and 
citizenship (Wright 2003: 5).9  
The second development is the emergence, since the late 1990s, of various contentious 
political and social interventions that can be loosely brought under the label of anti- or alter-
globalisation politics. The inscription of migration-related struggles within the framework of the 
anti-globalisation movement has not been an obvious and unproblematic development. In fact, 
the earlier forms of transnational anti-globalisation political interventions largely left migration 
issues aside, as illustrated for example by the absence of specifically migration-focussed 
workshops in the earlier editions of the World Social Forum. This was mostly due to the fact that 
the ‘globalisation’ of immigration controls was not as obvious as that of trade and finance and is 
still characterised by a complex intertwining of national and supranational practices. However, 
both analytically and practically, this gap has been significantly bridged and migration has been 
firmly inscribed on the WSF’s agenda since at least its fifth edition in 2005. In Europe, Sandro 
Mezzadra notes that the 2001 Genoa protests in Italy already saw the organisation of a large 
migrant rally, which he identifies as the first encounter between migrant organisations and the 
‘global movement': 
 
… the demonstration on 19 July 2001, which opened the protests against the G8 meeting 
in Genoa with the slogan ‘Freedom of movement - freedom without boundaries’, has put 
the issues of migrants before the ‘global movement’ born in Seattle for the first time. 
(Mezzadra 2004: 268) 
 
The European Social Forum (ESF), the regional expression of the so-called Global Justice 
Movement, has thus been strongly influenced by anti-racist and pro-migrant themes and, 
reciprocally, anti-capitalist events and social forums have been important moments in the 
development of pro-migrant groups and networks working transnationally in Europe. Most of 
my participants had directly participated in an ESF or another large anti/alter-globalist gathering, 
and the discourse, analysis and tactics of the anti-capitalist movement have had a strong influence 
on the ways in which these groups understand themselves and their struggle and design their 
actions and tactics. This might not be immediately obvious with all the interviewed groups, yet 
my participants recognise the relevance of the anti-capitalist critique in order to understand the 
EU's immigration and border regime.10 One of the participants summed up this close relationship 
as follows: ‘we are anti-capitalist, feminist, anti-debt of the third world. These are our values. But 
we also are action-oriented in our local context. We merge the local and the global’.11 Another 
one also stipulated that: ‘one cannot understand migrations today without internationalising the 
issue. This is why we have a global, in fact alter-global, approach’.12 In particular, it is clear to 
them that the border control practices of a given EU member state cannot be seen as simply the 
expression of an unjust national government. Rather, all the groups and networks inscribe their 
analysis within a larger reflection on the roles of borders globally, and their relationship with 
other global dynamics of domination and exploitation. Another aspect is the use by pro-migrant 
groups and networks in Europe of tools and tactics developed by anti-globalisation activists, such 
as transnational mailing lists and forms of action directed against non-state actors. The 
 
9 See also McNevin 2006 and Lowry and Nyers 2003. 
10 For example, MRN’s Director explained that the official narrative of his organisation tended to be more liberal and 
human rights-oriented but that it didn't invalidate a critical understanding of global migration nowadays.   
11 Interview with Fasti’s Anna Sibley (Paris, September 2012) 
12 Interview with Gisti’s Jean Pierre Alaux (Paris, September 2012) 
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intersection between the anti-globalisation movement’s politics and tactics and the particular 
traditions and cultures of the various groups participating in the research is a complex one but it 
has been a key structuring factor for migration struggles in Europe.  
Finally, the institutional terrain on which these groups and campaigns are fighting 
strongly diverges from that of previous pro-migrant initiatives. The participant groups and 
campaigns exist in particular local and national settings operating through their own political 
institutions but, at the same time, they all engage in a transnational political praxis. As previously 
mentioned, the transnationalisation of their work has been the result of the realisation that 
immigration and asylum controls had changed and had to be fought at different levels and by 
addressing different actors – in particular that there was a need to fight beyond national 
boundaries and to confront trans- and supranational institutions. The evolution of the centre of 
power and decision-making into a multi-layered and complex transnational and 
intergovernmental assemblage has thus called for new structures and tactics in order to efficiently 
address the new political and institutional setting in which they operate. 
 
 
When and Why: The Emergence of Transnational Pro-Migrant Actors in the EU 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that an increasing transnationalisation of migration struggles has 
been taking place in the EU in response to the harmonisation of immigration laws and policies in 
Europe, I asked my participants a series of questions concerning their relationship with the EU 
and the ways in which the process of communitarisation of legislative frameworks related to 
migration and asylum had affected their work. A strikingly consistent narrative emerged, 
identifying a number of key moments in the development of European legislation, which 
decisively encouraged activists to operate at the European level and to develop transnational links 
with groups in other EU member countries.  
The Europeanisation of legislative frameworks governing issues related to migration and 
asylum has been a key area of cooperation between EU member states at least since the 1985 
Schengen Agreement, which envisaged a zone of free movement between five countries of the 
European Community at the time (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg). The rationale for Europeanising immigration and asylum policies was that the free 
movement of people within the EU/ECC space could only happen if, first, all member states 
applied identical criteria regarding entry requirements into their territory for ‘third country’ 
nationals and, second, if the controls which had been waived at the EU’s internal borders were 
reported and reinforced at its external borders. These legislations, which had started as inter-
governmental regulations, were fully incorporated into European legislation with the 1997 Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The Treaty was implemented at the 1999 Tampere Summit, which was strongly 
criticised by European civil society organisations for its secrecy, lack of transparency and the 
association it made between ‘immigration’ and ‘security’ (Statewatch 2003). Subsequently, the 
harmonisation was further codified with the 2006 Schengen Borders Code13 and the 2010 
Schengen Visa Code14 which legislate on border surveillance, joint controls and cooperation 
between member states regarding border checks and govern the role of the European external 
border agency, Frontex. Another development brought about by the Schengen Agreement is the 
 
13 See Schengen Borders Code < http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0001:0032:EN:PDF> [last accessed in March 2013]. 
14 See Schengen Visa Code <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995R1683:EN:HTML> [last accessed in March 2013]. 
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Schengen Information System (SIS), a policing information network that was created to 
supposedly compensate for any security ‘deficit’ that could be engendered by the removal of 
internal border controls in the EEC/EU and which constitutes a transnational database storing 
information concerning various ‘risk groups and individuals’, accessible by Europe’s police forces 
and security agencies (Lodge 2009: 142).  
 Several participants admitted that it was not until the mid- and late 1990s that they took 
full measure of what was happening at the EU level. They acknowledged feeling concerned 
following the 1985 signature of the Schengen agreement, in particular as it failed to address the 
issue of the status of ‘third country nationals’ and started to refer to the reinforcement of 
Europe's external borders, but it was not until the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which created the 
EU and European citizenship as an exclusively derivative status, that the discriminatory and 
exclusive nature of the Union was fully grasped. Soon after Maastricht, the process of 
Europeanisation of immigration and asylum laws was initiated, boosted by the 1995 
implementation of Schengen. This process encouraged closer collaboration between activists in 
different EU member states, both to exchange information in order to understand what the 
effects of these developments were and to share ideas about how to resist them. An interviewee 
from Gisti summarised these evolutions as follows: 
 
At Gisti, there was a preoccupation since the late 1980s … regarding what would come 
out of the Schengen Agreement. Some of our members were paying close attention … to 
something which the French associations were not talking about - the implementation of 
this Schengen agreement, which was going to reorganise circulation inside what was then 
the Schengen area … and all the consequences it would have on the status of migrants in 
France… But it was really difficult to work with our traditional associative partners, 
because all this seemed very theoretical for these partners. It wasn’t there… Contrarily to 
what was happening in other countries, the French government never publicly announced 
the negotiations or what was being talked about in Brussels about the implementation of 
this Schengen Area (…) But we quickly anticipated that from this system would come out 
many things which would have rather serious implications, and that we had to be ready 
for what would come next. And thus to find partners elsewhere, outside France…15 
 
While it might have been the case that, at first, the developments were going unnoticed in France, 
participants in Italy which, like other Mediterranean countries, was suddenly turned into a border 
guard country for western and northern European member states, draw a very different picture:16  
 
In Italy, until the mid 1980s, we didn’t have any immigration law. Issues to do with 
migration and residency were still governed through a royal decree from the 1930s, which 
basically gave administrative discretion on the matter. Of course, I am not saying that 
Italy was a heaven for immigrants. But that changed very rapidly after 1995, when the 
Schengen Agreement was coming into place, and Italy was told it had to adopt 
immigration policies that were along the lines of those that existed in northern European 
countries. Not only the law changed, there was a discourse to go with it, and you could 
see the change in people’s attitude, you could see racist graffiti appearing on the walls … 
 
15 Interview with Gisti’s Claire Rodier (Paris, September 2012). 
16 Similarly, in Portugal, the post-Salazar immigration laws passed in the mid 1980s had to be strongly tightened 
under pressure from the EU in 1993, in preparation for the implementation of Schengen. 
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You know, there was definitely a new form of racist discourse in the media, by the 
politicians, that was being pushed forward, in the name of Europe.17  
 
It is at the occasion of the 1999 Tampere summit that, for the first time, these diverse 
experiences were brought together by activists. Schneider, a No Border activist and blogger, 
remembers the days leading up to the formation of the No Border network before 1999 as 
follows: 
 
It all began with a meeting in Amsterdam, at the margins of a big demonstration against 
the EU summit in 1997 ... The priorities and objectives of the political work in each 
country were gravely different, but what the groups had in common was the demand for 
practical, political intervention at the base i.e. grassroots politics. The new network was 
… concerned with systematically creating the preconditions for a Europe-wide 
collaboration, whose purpose was in the first place to enrich the every-day activities in 
each and every country … Yet, although a regular exchange of information was arranged 
amongst the participants of the first network meeting, the initial zest soon died away … 
However, this was about to change: in 1999 the network was renamed "Noborder" and 
relaunched with the European-wide protest action to mark the occasion of the EU's 
special summit "justice and the interior" in Tampere. This latter was expressly dedicated 
to the aim of standardizing the asylum and migration politics in the European context. In 
the preparation some Noborder groups had managed to connect with promising contacts 
in France and, above all, in Italy. On this basis a common European day-of-action was 
arranged (…) to protest in a decentralized but coordinated manner against a new chapter 
in the politics of separation: (…) more exclusion, more control, more deportation.18 
 
For these activists, the word Tampere became shorthand for the Europeanisation of immigration 
and asylum policy. It came to stand for the very process whereby a certain Europe, based on a 
system of segregation and discrimination and on a discourse of exclusion, was taking shape. It 
was a key moment in the history of many of the autonomous migrant solidarity groups: from 
then on, they started to consistently try to match the practices of national governments by 
making their tactics and activities similarly transnational. Following the Tampere counter-
demonstrations, the European No Border network emerged. 1999 was also the year when 
PICUM was established in Brussels. PICUM came about at the initiative of a group of grassroots 
organisations from Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, which shared similar concerns 
regarding the lack of protection for undocumented migrants in the new European legal 
framework on immigration and asylum. PICUM’s Director explained that: 
 
As the laws around migration were being transferred into the legal structure of the EU, 
groups in various member states realised that … the issue of undocumented migrants was 
left out of these juridical developments and that they would not gain any form of 
protection through the process of Europeanisation. We felt undocumented migrants and 
the problems they face had to be defended in the EU, and the best way for us to have 
 




leverage was to join forces and literally ‘turn up the volume’: make our voices louder by 
shouting together.19 
 
Tampere called itself a summit on ‘freedom, justice and security’, presented as core tenets of the 
European project. But activists were quick to denounce that the quest for a European identity 
was being led at the expense of many other European residents: all those who did not have 
citizenship in one of the member states. European citizenship did not therefore move away from 
the exclusionary features of national identity discourses but, in fact, added an additional layer of 
exclusion for non-citizens.  
 
 
How and What: Activities, Tactics and Tools of Pan-European Pro-Migrant Actors  
 
With the successful institutionalisation of the nation-state, peaking in the late 18th and 19th 
centuries, political action and affiliations had become increasingly concentrated at the national 
level. In this paper I have argued that, in the case of the supranationalisation of political 
frameworks that is taking place under the auspices of the European Union, the dominant 
attempts at fostering a sense of shared political destiny among the ‘people of Europe has largely 
failed. Yet, a process of transnationalisation of contentious politics and identity has nonetheless 
been taking place in order to oppose and challenge discourses and policies coming from the EU. 
During the course of my interviews, I asked members of the participant organisations and 
campaigns to explain the ways in which they developed, strengthened and expanded pan-
European links. The sets of activities, tools and tactics they described fall into three broad 
categories: communication and decision-making, network (building and expanding) and 
organising joint protests and actions. I am using this classification for the sake of analytical clarity 
but many activities fall within at least two of these categories.  
 
Transnat ional communicat ion  
Communication tools used by pro-migrant groups across Europe can be divided into two 
separate, yet sometimes overlapping, categories: on the one hand, groups and campaigns develop 
internal communication tools and, on the other hand, they design ways to communicate with the 
wider public, the media, relevant political institutions and other groups focusing on different 
issues. As many scholars examining internal communication among activist networks have 
observed, mailing lists are the preferred communication tool for many activist groups and 
campaigns (Kavada 2007; Saeed, Rohde and Wulf 2011). For example, since 2003, Migreurop has 
run a public mailing list intended for the ‘circulation of information and debates about the 
European externalisation policies and detention centres for migrants’.20 The list currently has 982 
subscribers,21 which includes numerous groups. Subscription is opened to all those who are 
interested in receiving and sending relevant information. The average number of emails circulated 
is just over 100 per month. 22  However, Migreurop is organised through a number of working 
 
19 Interview with PICUM’s Director (Skype, June 2012). 
20http://archives.rezo.net/archives/migreurop.mbox/Y5XOJHJPMKROR5HKN4OMMFDBI5N3LZPV  
21 Figures checked on 19 March 2013. 
22 These are my own calculations based on list circulation during six months (July to December 2012). 
 23 
groups devoted to organising the network’s activities related to specific topics.23  All these 
working groups have their own private mailing lists.  
Similarly, all No Border groups in Europe have set up local mailing lists where they 
exchange information relevant to their particular contexts, but there also exists a Europe-wide 
list, the Action 2 list, where information and announcements are exchanged between groups and 
activists across national contexts. The history of this list is an interesting illustration of the 
dynamics of transnationalisation of pro-migrant activists in Europe and the interaction between 
online and offline developments. It was agreed to set up the list in October 2004 in order to help 
coordinating a European day of action for migrants that had been called for at the European 
Social Forum (ESF) in London that year. This followed the success of the first European day of 
action ‘against detention centres and for the legalisation of all undocumented migrants’, which 
had taken place on 31 January 2004 and had seen demonstrations in 40 cities across Europe.24 
This day had been an important step in the networking process necessary for the 
Europeanisation of migration struggles. The callout for the second day of action aimed to build 
on this success in order to further develop communication structures transnationally. It was 
aimed at ‘all groups, networks and social movements, not only the ones working on migration-
related issues’.25 At the time, groups from Italy, France, Spain, Germany, the UK, Greece, 
Portugal, Belgium and Slovenia joined the Action 2 mailing list in order to communicate with 
each other about the demonstrations and actions they were planning in their local and national 
contexts at this occasion. After the second European day of action took place, the Action 2 list 
remained active and it is used to this day.  
Besides providing transnational communication structures, these mailing lists have also 
played in key role in ‘Europeanising’ issues, as one of the participants from Fasti put it:  
 
If we face a problem and we need other activists and organisations to know about it 
quickly, in order for example to elicit a quick response, well if we send an email to the list, 
the local problem becomes immediately European. 26  
 
In this sense, this communication process among activists and groups contributes to the  
construction of a more sophisticated analysis and a common discourse, based on the wide range 
of experiences and information circulated on the lists. It is worth noting here that this form of 
transnational communication tools were first developed and used by the anti-capitalist movement 
and later appropriated at various levels and in various ways by other types of groups and 
networks. They are another telling example of the influence of the ‘global’ anti-capitalist 
movement on activists in Europe and the West more generally.  
In order to engage in external communication, different types of tools, platforms and 
activities are used. The more established and institutionalised groups, such as MRN and PICUM, 
often produce a regular newsletter to keep members and/or interested groups and individuals 
informed of their activities as well as of relevant political and policy developments. For instance, 
PICUM first started distributing its newsletter in 2004. In 2011, the organisation decided to set 
up two different platforms for its public communication work. An electronic bulletin is now 
circulated on a fortnightly basis in English and a newsletter is produced every three months in six 
 
23 For example, Migreurop has a group working on detention, another on externalisation, as well as several working 
groups working on the different aspects of its campaigns. 
24 An archive of call outs for action can be found at http://www.meltingpot.org/rubrica119.html?art=30  
25 Ibid  
26 Interview with Anna Sibley from Fasti (Paris, September 2012).  
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languages (French, German, Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese and Italian) as a summary of the 
previous six English bulletins.27 The bulletin focuses on significant developments concerning 
migrant rights at various policy levels (national, EU but UN). It also has a section session on 
events, publications and PICUM member organisations’ activities. PICUM decided to have a 
more regular bulletin but could not afford fortnightly translation hence the recourse to a quarterly 
multi-lingual newsletter. 28  Similarly, MRN sends out a weekly newsletter to around 5,000 email 
subscribers in the UK, Europe and beyond. It focuses on policy development in the UK and the 
EU but instead of simply relaying information produced elsewhere it also contains MRN’s own 
analysis of current topics and links to MRN’s blogs these issues. This newsletter was quoted as a 
reliable source of information on the sector by other individuals working in similar organisations 
in Europe.29  
External communication is also organised through events and publications, which groups, 
campaigns and organisations undertake in order to spread their message and discourse to a wider 
public, which might not be familiar with the issues they are working on. This type of external 
communication often requires a thorough work of ‘re-framing’ so as to make the analyses more 
accessible and engaging for people who are familiar with pro-migrant work. The different ways in 
which activists and groups frame their discourse depending on their audience can be exemplified 
by Migreurop’s ‘Map of the camps’. The map, of which five editions have been published so far 
in several languages, 30 visually represents the various centres and sites of migrant detention in 
Europe and at its borders. While Migreurop also produces written literature on the issue of 
migrant detention, the addition of a map has been a key tool to translate often complex and 
detailed information into an accessible and easily communicable message.  
Organising or participating in public events is also a common tactic used by groups and 
organisations in order to communicate their message to people who would not usually be on 
their mailing lists or read their newsletters. Events follow a wide range of formats, from 
academic-type seminars and panel discussions, workshops and stalls at festivals and conferences, 
to cultural events such as concerts, exhibitions and film screenings. When participating in events, 
organisations and groups might participate in an event that is not directly related to migration 
with the aim of bringing the issue to the attention of a new audience. This could be seen as public 
communication through a process of mainstreaming migration-related issues into various other 
circles. In this respect, it is interesting to know that, for many years, autonomous activists who 
then became part of networks such as No Border and Migreurop, were meeting at the fringe of 
other transnational manifestations, such as the ESF. This allowed them to meet without 
necessarily having the resources to organise transnational gatherings themselves. Yet, it was also a 
way to make sure migration as a theme was represented at these events. In a similar vein, groups 
and organisations participate in trade union conferences (NOII, Fasti, Gisti) and pan-European 
conferences (Migreurop, European Alternatives, PICUM).   
 
Bui lding and expanding networks 
I have distinguished between communication and network-building activities in the sense that 
network-building work, both internal (consolidation) and external (expansion), has the clear 
intention of recruiting and retaining members. ‘Maintaining a network alive’ says Migreurop 
 
27 Interview with Anna Sibley from Fasti (Paris, September 2012).  
28 Interview with Michele Levoy from Picum (Skype, June 2012) 
29 Interview with PICUM’s Director (Skype, June 2012). 
30 The fifth edition is accessible online at http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/jpg/map_18-
1_L_Europe_des_camps_2011_v11_EN.jpg.  
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coordinator Eva Ottavy, ‘is not a small task; it is a systematic and organised job. This job requires 
structures and tools, which allow equal participation of all and solidify the links between our 
various members’. 31  The wide availability of online tools, which allow the active involvement of 
network members or fellow activists, is of course crucial in this regard. Eva Ottavy adds: 
 
We are not a political party, we are an associative network, and what that means is that we 
do not have a centralised decision-making power and then members implementing them. 
Our network is a horizontal platform, which means we need tools to allow horizontality 
in our everyday work. And if you want a network to be transnational, you must develop 
transnational horizontal networking tools. (…) This is why we have our working groups, 
and we internationalise the daily life of the network, we have more and more Skype 
meetings so that our colleagues in other countries can participate as much as people here 
in France or nearby. And we also do a big work of translation. 32 
 
Migreurop also organises yearly rencontres internationales (‘international meetings’) for its members. 
The first such meeting took place in Seville, Spain, in 2005. Given the network’s wide 
geographical spread, it has since tried to have these meetings in various countries inside and 
outside Europe and to cover the travel costs of representatives from its member organisations. 
There have been rencontres in Rabat, Morocco (2006), Paris, France (2009), Istanbul, Turkey 
(2010) and Cecina, Italy (2011). The rencontres are, above all, the main opportunity for network 
members to meet each other in person and, therefore, play a vital part in the strengthening of the 
network. As the network’s coordinator argues ‘meeting in person adds something qualitatively 
different: it does not mean we cannot work with people we have only met virtually, but 
something gets strengthened when there is face to face contact’.33  A number of partner and like-
minded organisations are also invited to attend these meetings, which has been crucial to the 
expansion of the network.  
One should not, however, forget the limitations of such inter/transnational meetings: 
they generally take place on a yearly basis and even where conscious efforts of inclusion are 
deployed, they will tend to exclude those who cannot obtain visas or whose individual situation 
prevents them from travelling (having children and so on). Those pragmatic constraints might 
shape, to an extent, activists’ profiles. Though they can be successful at reinforcing links between 
groups in the case of a tight network like Migreurop, they can sometimes also be mere 
formalities, with little concrete outcomes. The Communication Officer at MRN admitted that  
 
some of these things [European meetings] are definitely over-estimated. (…) We still go, 
but I find very little value in that sort of, err… (…) It is sort of an external initiative: a 
“we need to share experiences, and we need to talk” (…). But it is always the same 
people, the Brussels people and a few more who are reps of big NGOs in member 
countries… Or maybe sometimes you meet groups that are so different to you that you 
don’t really see the usefulness of meeting them… On the other hand, some of the less 
formal ways of collaboration have a lot more added value to them… the problem with 
that is that it is very difficult to sustain them because you kind of, I mean, you obviously 
need funding for pretty much everything you do. 34   
 
31 Interview with Migreurop’s Coordinator Eva Ottavy (Paris, September 2012). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Interview with MRN’s Communication Officer, Jan Brulc (London, April 2012). 
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This quote above touches on three important issues characteristic of large transnational events: 
the risk that only a small cosmopolitan elite will be represented, the varied organisational models 
across the groups and the obstacles to collaboration that they can pause and the lack of 
autonomous resources available to most transnational networks and campaigns (see della Porta 
2009: 34). However, the limitations that this type of events may entail can be contrasted with the 
efficiency of what we can call ‘encounter in action’.  
Building and strengthening networks can come as a positive by-product of initiatives or 
activities organising with other primary purposes, such as protesting, and the weaving of links 
does not only take place on the day and site of the action itself, but throughout the preparation 
process. Organising a coordinated day of action, for instance, may not eventually lead to a 
physical encounter between the various groups planning an event in their national settings, yet it 
may encourage people to be in contact with one another and to collaborate, hence producing and 
strengthening links and networks. Describing a ESF, Nicole Doerr (2006) notes that: 
 
Often, representatives of local groups or activists from different countries came together 
at the transnational level with more open-mindedness and curiosity about each other’s 
histories than at the national level, where cleavages within and between social movements 
have consolidated along traditional fractures and personal enmities. 
 
This is an interesting remark that can give us an indication of the importance of groups’ 
participation in transnational events for the consolidation of networks. Almost all the participants 
to my research said they had participated in at least one transnational event or meeting, such as 
the World Social Forum, European Social Forum or a European Day of Action. In the section 
below, I will focus on a number of events and actions that have taken prominence in the 
migration struggles field in Europe and analyse their ability to disrupt dominant discourses and 
practices. While I will primarily discuss how tactics are used and shared by activists with the 
intended purpose of protesting and disrupting, it is also important to keep in mind their 
networking potential.  
 
Transnational is ing protes t    
Certain forms of European-wide protests have by now become strongly associated with the 
migration field. An important example in this regard is the No Border camps. No Border camps 
deserve particular attention as a form of politics and activism that redefines the scope of 
contentious action in the field of migration in Europe whilst at the same time following a long 
tradition of protest tactics, that of the protest camp. No Border camps are also of interest, I 
would argue, because they have influenced the discourses and practices of other pro-migrant 
groups by bringing direct action to the migration struggle field and by expanding the boundaries 
of the acceptable discourse when it comes to the issues of migration, sovereignty and citizenship. 
Before moving on to a detailed analysis of the No Border camps, it is useful to consider once 
more the specificity of No Border as a network.  
It would be difficult to qualify No Border as a ‘movement’, at least in the traditional 
sense, due to its largely decentralised, diffuse and transnational nature. Many No Border activists 
consider ‘No Border’ as a label that can be claimed by anyone subscribing to such politics, which 
tacitly implies a strong anarchist affiliation. This anarchist tradition is better understood in terms 
of the tactics, methods and practices used by the network, rather than as a strictly defined 
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ideological position.35 No Border activists believe in horizontal, non-hierarchical structures of 
organising and reject the binary identities of citizen/non-citizen, legal/illegal.36 The network is a 
social and political site, that does not operate through a permanent membership model, but 
rather through a common thread of political beliefs and principles that links a number of radical 
migrant solidarity groups and campaigns together.  
Pausing to reflect on the camp as a contentious political practice in the context of my 
research is particularly relevant, not least because of the symbolism associated with camps in the 
field of migration. Indeed, recent literature on migration controls and securitisation has focused 
on the camp as a ‘zone of exception’ paradigmatic of sovereign power (Agamben 1998). The 
image of a pro-migrant camp is in this sense highly powerful. On the other hand, the camp as a 
tactic of protest (exemplified by peace camps but also, for instance, in campsites set up by 
homeless people in urban centres37) also has a long history that has largely escaped scholarly 
examination. The camp must thus be examined as a political act establishing a site of solidarity 
that asserts the right to presence and belonging (hooks 1990) and proposes a space for the 
existence of new political subjectivities (Walters 2006).  
No Border camps can be analysed within the tradition of camps as a political act: they are 
set up at particular geographical locations of symbolic relevance for the European border regime 
and emphasise the relationship between situational experiences and larger dynamics at work in 
Europe. They also aim to re-politicise the sanitised everydayness of repressive immigration and 
border controls by exposing their devastating consequences on people’s lives.38 No Border camps 
have taken place at physical borders, at immigration detention centres, near airports associated 
with forcible deportation and, as was the case with the Strasbourg and Brussels camps, at 
emblematic sites of EU power and decision-making. These camps can be looked at through 
Hakin Bey’s notion of ‘temporary autonomous zones’ (Walters 2006) in the sense that they aim 
to create temporary spaces that elude formal structures of control. Typically, a No Border camp 
will be a horizontal space of experience-sharing and political debates, with various workshops 
and discussions, as well as a number of planned and spontaneous direct actions and protests 
aimed at the ‘disruption of the running of the border regime’. 39 In addition to their protesting 
dimension, No Border camps are key moments in the consolidation of the network, with activists 
from the various groups operating under the label in different countries travelling to the camp. 
Whilst local and national groups have regular meetings, the camps are the most important 
occurrence of network-wide (European) meetings, bringing together people from different 
countries face to face to conjointly develop the analysis and tactics of the network as a whole. 
They are also moments when the network expands by engaging with the new activists, migrants 
and local communities and asserting a publicly visible presence through protests and actions in 
the cities and countries where they take place. The network has also adopted innovative tactics 
and technological tools to expand beyond the limitations imposed by geographical locations, as 
described by No Border activist Kuemmer:   
 
[No Border] actions were expanded and the ideas spread. This resulted last summer in a 
border camp chain, which started in Tarifa in southern Spain (Spain-Africa) and 
 
35 Interview with No Borders UK’s Sean (London, April 2012) 
36 Ibid. 
37 See for example in France: http://www.youphil.com/fr/article/04149-rencontre-avec-les-expulses-de-la-cite-des-
4000?ypcli=ano 
38 Interviews and personal conversations with No Borders UK’s activist (London, April 2012 and on-going) 
39 Interview with No Borders UK’s activist Alex (London, January 2013). 
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continued through Krykni (Poland-Ukraine), Lendava (Slovenia) and the internal border 
at the Frankfurt airport (Germany) … Permanently crossing borders, the noborderTOUR 
connected border camps with other sites of resistance … Connections were also made in 
virtual space: the "borderstream" visualized three border camps that took place 
simultaneously ... Strasbourg 2002 is now the first event organized by the entire noborder 
network as a joint action with anti-racist social movements, groups and individuals from 
15 different countries. 40  
 
Organising transnational events, campaigns and days of action is a crucial objective for all 
the participant networks and groups in a double sense: to stage various forms of public protest as 
well as to forge and consolidate transnational links and alliances. Eva Ottavy explains that inter-
associative campaigns are an increasing focus for Migreurop, which used to primarily focus on 
internal networking work, but has now realised the ‘complementarity between strengthening the 
network inside, and expanding it outside’. 41 The case of B4P is illustrative in this respect: the 
campaign was largely supported by Migreurop and its member organisations, but a number of 
other associations, groups and individual activists also supported it in a variety of ways. 
According to a participant in B4P:  
 
It was great to take part [in B4P] as it brought us closer to other activists and groups. We 
might have known them through emails but now we feel we have comrades. And new 
projects have come out of the campaign, like the Watch the Med idea. This campaign was 
just the start of something bigger! 42     
 
An interesting effect of the transnationalisation of pro-migrant protests in Europe has 
been the sharing and mixing of tactics and strategies between and across groups and networks. 
For instance, B4P’s idea of a flotilla stopping over at various symbolic points of the EU border 
regime around the Mediterranean Sea, and staging symbolic actions and protests to denounce the 
effect of EU policies on people’s lives, strongly inspired another campaign: one year later, in the 
summer of 2013, a new flotilla project called ‘Voices from the Border’ took place with 
participants from the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the UK. One of the ‘Voices from the 
Borders’ main members, a Dutch activist based in Amsterdam, was involved in B4P the previous 
summer and decided to initiate a similar campaign in his own context and with another set of 
partners. This is an interesting illustration of the ways in which tactics used by pro-migrant 
groups and campaigns travel beyond their original site and are re-appropriated and re-used in 
different spaces by other activists. 
Another example of this has to do with the forms of actions that pro-migrant groups and 
activists stage. Organising conventional symbolic actions and protests has been a common tactic. 
For instance, at the launch of the Frontexit campaign, in Brussels in March 2013, fake migrant 
raids were orchestrated with Migreurop activists staging street arrests in public spaces in order to 
make this practice visible to passers-by. However, some groups and networks, such as the No 
Border and Stop Deportation networks, have focused on more unconventional direct rather than 
symbolic actions with the aim of actually interrupting immigration control practices. 43  These 
include actions intended to disrupt, delay or stop immigration raids and forcible deportations, 
 
40 http://www.republicart.net/disc/hybridresistance/kuemmer01_en.htm  
41 Interview with Eva Ottavy (Paris: September 2012). 
42 Interview with a participant in B4P (Lampedusa: July 2012). 
43 Interview with No Border activist Sean (London: April 2012). 
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where activists attempt to physically block the arrests or deportation of migrants. An important 
aspect of direct action is that it does not try to pressure national and European authorities into 
stopping or changing their policies. Rather, it aims to disrupt the process through direct 
intervention, using various types of traditional and innovative protests, occupations and 
blockades. Such actions also often target other, non-state actors, such as the security companies, 
travel agents and airlines complicit in forcible deportations. Tactics include the occupation of the 
company’s offices or calling for the boycotts of particular businesses.  
This is perhaps the most visible illustration of the way in which migration struggles in 
Europe have been adopting some of the tactics from the global anti-capitalist or anti-
globalisation movement, as well as of the new political and institutional terrain on which some 
pro-migrant groups are operating. This Europeanisation of immigration law has placed activists 
in the face of a new type of power and decision-making structure, characterised by its elusiveness 
and lack of transparency, as seen in the description of the EU as a political structure in earlier 
chapter. The issues of governance in the field of migration may not necessarily be the same as 
those in the areas of trade and finance, where anti-globalisation activists understood the 
unwillingness of individual states to apply pressure on corporate power and, thus, increasingly 
adopted direct actions tactics aimed both at disrupting international meetings (such as G8 and 
G20 summits) and at targeting and pressurising corporations. Yet, I would argue that the lack of 
representation mechanisms in the EU, as well as in national states applying European law, has led 
to the adoption of similar tactics. Indeed, the process of Europeanisation of migration law and of 
transnationalisation of migration struggles has led to the radicalisation of the ‘repertoires of 
contention’ used by pro-migrant activists and groups. For example, tactics originally used mostly 
by No Border-type groups, such as the denunciation of and ‘reputational damage’ to companies 
and businesses involved in the border regime and the ‘deportation machine’, are now commonly 
used by other more traditional pro-migrant groups and campaigns.  
The history of this convergence of analytical, political and strategic frameworks and its 
relation to the Europeanisation of migration and asylum law on the hand and the development of 
other transnational social movements in Europe one the other hand was summed up by one of 
the participants as follows:  
Our first attempts (…) to work with European partners were a lot more difficult (…) I 
really think there was a shift, in the years 2000s, in the relationships we were able to 
establish with our European partners. I think one aspect is that indeed migration policies 
have Europeanised and that similar issues started to emerge (…) And there also was, as I 
mentioned with the European Social Forum and the World Social Forums, the influence 
of the social movements, that started developing in all domains, not only migration but a 
lot of domains – housing, women struggles… (…) It started mixing people, mixing 
activists, making them meet, speak to each other… (…) And this created a sort of culture 
that enabled the emergence of a common openness, of common values and of common 
actions.44 
 




The process of harmonisation of migration and asylum laws in the EU has involved legal, 
discursive and practical developments, which have caused grievances and encouraged contentious 
reactions within the migrant solidarity activist scene in different European countries. The 
transnationalisation of resistance has been seen as essential in order to ‘match the level of the 
attack’, or has organically developed in response to some of the transnational practices of the EU. 
However, activists seem to require concrete examples of the consequences of the legal and 
discursive developments regarding migration and asylum in the EU for their awareness of the 
importance of activism at the European level to be raised. An important question that my 
research is also addressing is that of the emergence of collective, transnational European 
identities and alternative political subjectivities. Indeed, many of my participants only saw Europe 
as a negative reference point and not as a space where positive political interventions could take 
place. Instead, a series of regional, international or non-European cross-border identities were 
formulated and re-enacted. The question of whether migrant solidarity struggles in Europe can 
become a strong and robust social movement in the absence of a unified discourse and a shared 
identity thus remains to be explored.  
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